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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
POLITICAL' AFFILIATION AS QUALIFICATION FOR
OFFICE
An Indiana statute provides for the appointment of a
two man board of registration by the judge of the circuit
court. One man from each of the two leading political parties is to be appointed upon the recommendation of the county
chairman. The judge refused to appoint the Democratic
chairman's nomination and an original action for mandamus
was brought in the Indiana Supreme Court. The court held
that the appointment was an administrative duty placed upon
the judge, and the requirement to select from political parties
was a direction to the "appointing officer." State ex rel
Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court, '72 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 1947).
The problem presented is one of statutory construction.
The court must determine whether the intention of the legislature was to create a class-that is, whether the public has
been divided into those having a specific qualification as a
condition precedent to holding office and those who do notor was it the legislature's intention to give advice to the
appointing officers which he need not follow?
Although the court does not say that the county chairman
is the appointing officer, they treat him as such, 2 thus
making the statute apply directly to him. The statute amounts
to a mandatory requirement that the chairman select from
definite political parties.3 It also seems clear that the chair1.

2.

3.

Ind. Acts 1945, c. 208 § 50, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945)
§ 29--3406. "In and for any county having a population of eighty
thousand (80,000) . . . the judge of the circuit court in any
such county shall appoint the two (2) members of said board
of registration, one each from the two (2) political parties which
cast the highest and the next highest number of votes for secretary of state in such county at the last preceding general election
and who shall be legal voters of such county; such appointments
of the cirafter the
judgerecommendaten (10)thedays
shall
be made
written
respective
have received
shall within
cuit court
tions for said appointments from the two (2) county chairmen
of the said two (2) political parties the judge shall appoint such
"
nominees
The generally accepted view is that mandamus will not issue for
discretionary acts. State v. Gelb, 75 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1947);
State v. Curtin, 217 Ind. 190, 27 N.E.2d 909 (1940). Thus to
have mandamus issue the court had to find the judge bound by
the chairman's recommendation, which in effect makes the county
chairman the appointing officer.
Legislative intent normally controls the determination of whether
a statute is directive or mandatory. Kryder v. State, 214 Ind.

NOTES
men will select from their own parties.4 Thus, even if the
statute does not by its terms discriminate, the issue of classification is raised either by the statute's effect or by its administration5 Consequently the court should have considered
and ruled clearly upon the question of classification.
Statutes imposing membership in a political party as
qualification for office may be divided into two classes. The
first class include statutes providing that no nore than a
certain number of a board shall be from the same political
party. Courts have upheld this class as a limitation upon
the board and usually have not considered classification. 6 The
second class includes statutes directing selection from definite political parties. The courts have upheld this class as
directive7 and as reasonable classification.,
The statute in the principle case is of the second class.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

419, 15 N.E.2d 387 (1938); Smith v. State, 202 Ind. 185, 172 N.E.
911 (1930). Since the Indiana General Assembly does not record
committee activity, the question of legislative purpose must usually
be gleaned from a "fair reading" of the statute. Though this
alone appears to demand a mandatory construction it may be
supported by other rules. The use of the verb "shall" supports
a presumption of mandate. Lynn v. State, 207 Ind. 393, 193
N.E. 380 (1939); Board of Finance v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 44 Ind.
App. 578, 89 N.E. 904 (1909). It is said when a statute directs
action. on the part of public officers and the public interest would
require the action, the statute is mandatory. State v. Carmean,
138 Neb. 819, 295 N.W. 801 (1941); Elmer v. Comm'rs of Insurance, 304 Mass. 194, 23 N.E. 400 (1908). Presumably the people's
interest in registration would be better protected by a bi-partisan
board. See Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (Horack 3d ed.
1943) c. 58.
County chairmen's practice of recommending for appointment only
"good party workers" is so well known that a court might take
judicial notice. Cf. Evans v. Reiser, 78 Utah 253, 2 P.2d 615
(1931) (that court may take judicial notice that persons appointed judges of elections are of well known political affiliations).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) is the leading case in
this field. It laid down the rule that where the administration
or effect of a statute is to unfairly discriminate it will be set
aside even though valid on its face. See Dobbins v. Los Angeles,
195 U.S. 223 (1904); Park Hill Development v. Evansville, 190
Ind. 432, 130 N.E. 645 (1921).
Connally v. Reading, 268 Mich. 224, 256 N.W. 432 (1934); Wilson
v. McKelvey, 78 N.J.L. 621, 77 At. 94 (1910).
Jones v. Sargent, 145 Iowa 298, 124 N.W. 339 (1910) (This case
might be distinguished from the principal case because the statute
says appoint "so far as practical" from the two dominate parties);
Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224 (1889) (This
case might not be authority for a directive ruling since the court
said "probably directive but in any event reasonable classification.").
Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224 (1889);
Grinnell v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 (1886).
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Since the ruling that the statute is directive seems incorrect,
and the statute can only be sustained either as directive or
as reasonable classification, the court's result that the statute
is valid should have been based upon classification. There is
contra authority in Indiana to this result based upon classification-Evansville v. State,9 Holt v. Denny" and Harrel v.
Sullivan.", In all three cases the statutes were set aside under
the "privileges and immunities" section of the Indiana Constitution.12 However the language of the cases is not that of
unreasonable classification but indicates the court felt that
under the Indiana Constitution no qualifications or tests could
be imposed for the purpose of holding office. Since there
is no inherent right to hold office and the legislature may limit
the ability to hold office, 3 these cases in fact rely on the
doctrine of classification.14 This interpretation avoids conflict with the decisions allowing limitations. The principal
case appears to take the position that no test or qualification has been imposed; but if there has been, it is a reasonable
15

one.

Since the statute in the instant case either directly or
indirectly imposes a qualification for office, the result should
rest upon the dicta on classification, which leaves the case
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

118 Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1888).
118 Ind. 499, 21 N.E. 274 (1888). This case and the Evansville
case, n. 9 supra, arose under a statute requiring a board to appoint the members of the police and fire departments equally
from the two leading political parties.
220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942). This case arose on a statute
identical with the statute in the principal case.
Indiana Constitution Art. I § 23.
Mosely v. Board, 200 Ind. 515, 165 N.E. 241 (1929); Crampton
v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923); 46 C.J. 936 (1923);
Mechem, "Public Officers" (1890) §§ 64-68.
Also the "privileges and immunities" section of the Indiana Constitution is often compared to the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and is usually stated to be a problem of discrimination; not whether any burden may be imposed. Shedd v. Automobile Ins. Co., 208 Ind. 621, 196 N.E. 227 (1935); Fountain
Park v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927); Hammer v.
State, 173 Ind. 199, 89 N.E. 850 (1909).
Another possible interpretation is that the court meant only that
the officer appointed is not required to take an oath that he
belongs to a particular party as in Grinnell v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587,
5 N.E. 596 (1886).
But the court also cites Jones v. Sargent,
45 Iowa 298, 124 N.W. 339 (1910) where the statute required the
appointment of two from the dominant party and one from the
minority, and the court construed the statute as a direction and
upheld the appointment of two from the minority and one from
the dominant.
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in direct conflict with the Harrellcase. The statutes are identical, therefore they must be considered together.
Statutory classification is reasonable when the characteristics in the class established are germane to the purpose of
the legislation." The purpose of the classification is to provide personnel better fitted to secure improved registration of
voters. Thus, if the characteristics of the class relate to
the functions of the office the classification is reasonable.
The class established consists of those holding membership in
political parties. A member of a political party has a definite interest in protecting registration. The functions of the
office deal with registration of voters and the protection of
17
their interests. This is enough to sustain the classification.
Though sustaining the classification necessitates overrulling the Harrell case,' 8 the result is sound. The statute by
insuring a bi-partisan board better protects the voters against
the possibility of registration fraud. The difficulty if not
impossibility of securing a completely impartial board or official argues strongly for the bi-partisan board.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMMERCE CLAUSE STATE REGULATION OF
FEDERAL WAREHOUSES
A dealer in grain brought a complaint before the Illinois
Commerce Commission charging warehousemen, operating a
public warehouse for the storage of grain in Illinois, with
violations of Illinois warehouse laws.1 The warehousemen had
been licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to
16.

Board of Finance v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1934) ;
Fountain Park v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927);
Hirth-Krause v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N.E. 1 (1912).
17. Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (held "... . a difference
in fact or opinion . . ." is sufficient to sustain a classification).

18.

1.

It does not follow that the Evansville or Holt cases need be overruled. There is no apparent relationship between the normal duties
of the police and fire departments and an interest in political
parties to sustain the classification in these two cases.
Illinois Public Utilities Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1945)
e_111 %, §§ 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 41, 49, 49(a), and 50; Illinois Grain
Warehouse Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1945) c.114, §§ 293326(a). These sections relate to regulation of rates, discrimination, dual position of warehousemen, mixing of grain, rebates,
unsafe elevators, abandonment of service, and the filing and
publishing of rates. Petitioner also alleged violations of §§ 8a(3),
21, and 27 of the Public Utilities Act pertaining to certain aspects
of financing and control of financial structures.

